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AGENT ORANGE AND ASBESTOS: A CASE FOR
FEDERAL COMMON LAW
The mass toxic tort litigation explosion proves that the use of hazardous
chemicals presents difficult problems for the people who come into contact
with these substances. The instances of death and illness which follow such
contact not only pose complex questions of causation, but also of society's
role in fairly compensating victims. Afflictions arising from exposure to one
product may result in thousands of claims. These claims differ substantially
from those based upon a single tort incident such as an airplane crash or a
collapsed skywalk.' Mass tort litigation often involves similarly situated
plaintiffs filing lawsuits in many different jurisdictions.2
The main distinction drawn here, however, is that mass accident torts in-
volve far fewer jurisdictions than mass toxic torts. As a result, a mass acci-
dent tort litigant does not face the myriad of statutes of limitations problems
inherent in mass toxic tort cases. Mass toxic torts may involve latent claims
which draw not only those first injured, but also their families into the
dispute.
Other problems stem from indeterminate plaintiffs and defendants. For
the afflicted, there are relevant questions which involve the effects upon un-
born children as a result of the toxic exposure. The disparate amount of
toxic substances produced by defendant manufacturers clouds the ability to
assess fault.3 Discovery costs overburden the defendants facing suits in
many jurisdictions while plaintiffs lack adequate resources to challenge the
defendant companies. Such expenses not only divert funds which injured
1. These incidents involve a specific number of claimants in a limited number of jurisdic-
tions. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Mass. on July 31, 1973, 399 F. Supp. 1106
(D. Mass 1975); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), vacated 680 F.2d
1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
2. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 750 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) [hereinafter "Settlement Opinion"] (six hundred pre-consolidation cases were filed in
state and federal courts throughout the United States). See also In re Union Carbide Gas Plant
Disaster at Bhopal, India, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 199 (1987). The
Bhopal tragedy, which resulted in more than 2,000 deaths and 200,000 injuries, illustrates the
difficulty of managing a toxic tort disaster which also has international legal and jurisdictional
dimensions. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the case on the
grounds of forum non conveniens.
3. See In re Northern District of California Dalkon Shield IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 526
F. Supp. 887, 892 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1171 (1983).
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plaintiffs need, but also lead to company bankruptcy proceedings.4
The courts' adherence to the traditional methods of civil dispute resolu-
tion fails to address these problems resulting in a lack of uniformity in the
remedies even in instances where the illnesses of different plaintiffs arise
from the defendant's same tortious conduct. A less injured plaintiff could
receive more compensation than others similarly situated. Also, some state
statutes of limitations would honor claims while others would not.
The federal circuit courts have not recognized the strong federal interest
in mass tort litigation. Congress, through its broad commerce powers, has
passed numerous laws governing the manufacture and use of toxic chemi-
cals.5 These laws exhibit a strong national interest in protecting an unsus-
pecting public from the disastrous effects of toxic substances.
It is against this background that issues of federalism arise in mass tort
cases. The tradition of applying state law clashes with novel theories of
managing these disputes. These new theories stress the substantial federal
interest in mass tort litigation. The most compelling idea concerns the appli-
cation of federal common law to alleviate the burdens imposed upon plain-
tiffs, defendants and the courts.
This Comment stresses the need for the application of federal common
law in mass tort cases. The Comment first traces the historical and legal
importance of state law in tort disputes. A discussion of the overriding fed-
eral interest in the Agent Orange and asbestos cases follows this section.
Finally, this Comment examines the proposed solutions to mass tort choice-
of-law problems and proffers new methods for future adjudication.
I. THE ERIE DOCTRINE AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW
In Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins,6 the Supreme Court held that federal courts
do not have the general law-making powers of state courts. The limited ju-
risdiction of federal courts must follow state common law decisions as well
as state statutes in the absence of explicit governing federal law.
4. See T. WILLGING, TRENDS IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION 100 (Federal Judicial Center
1982) ("[a]t least six manufacturers of asbestos products have filed for Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion in bankruptcy court").
5. See, e.g., the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982 & Supp.
1987); the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982
& Supp. 1987); and the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812
(1982 & Supp. 1987).
6. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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A. Erie and Swift v. Tyson
In Swift v. Tyson,7 the Supreme Court held that Section 34 of the Judici-
ary Act of 1789' only required the application of state statutes and not of
state common law.9 Justice Story, writing for the majority, held that the
word "laws" in the Act spoke only to rules of the state legislature and not to
the common law.1 ° Swift involved the law of negotiable instruments which
Justice Story viewed as a matter involving the whole commercial world."'
The Supreme Court subsequently extended Swift beyond commercial law
into tort law. In B. & 0. Railroad v. Baugh, 2 the Court held that the ques-
tion of whether a train engineer and fireman were fellow-servants in the de-
fendant company in a negligence action was a matter of general common
law. 3 Referring to Swift, the Court cited the lack of a relevant state statute,
local custom, and property rules to negate the application of federal com-
mon law. While some commentators consider Baugh an "extreme extension
of Swift,"' 4 it represents an affirmation of Court precedent concerning rail-
roads. Baugh's dissent represents the first instance of growing judicial dis-
taste for the Swift doctrine. Justice Field, foreshadowing Swift's potential
abuse through forum shopping, dismissed federal common law as "little less
than what the judge advancing the doctrine thinks at the time should be the
7. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
8. 1 Stat. 92 ("The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties or
statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they
apply.").
9. Swift, 41 U.S. at 18.
10. Id. ("The laws of a State are more usually understood to mean the rules and enact-
ments promulgated by the legislative authority thereof, or long established local customs hav-
ing the force of law."). Id.
11. See C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 348 (4th ed. 1984); See also Field,
Source of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV., 881, 900 (1986).
12. 149 U.S. 368 (1893).
13. Id. at 370. ("This is not a question of local law, to be settled by an examination of the
decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio, the State in which the cause of action arose, and in
which the suit was brought, but one of general law .. "). Id.
14. Heckman, Uniform Commercial Law in the Nineteenth Century Federal Courts: The
Decline and Abuse of the Swift Doctrine, 27 EMORY L.J. 45, 58 (1978). See Railroad Co. v.
Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 368 (1873) (holding New York law inapplicable in negli-
gence action against a railroad); Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U.S. 213, 216 (1879) (holding
Texas law inconsequential in an employee's negligence suit). But see Bucher v. Cheshire Rail-
road Co., 125 U.S. 555, 584 (1888) (holding that Massachusetts common law barring recovery
in tort stemming from a violation of Sunday Blue Laws was sufficiently local); Detroit v. Os-
borne, 135 U.S. 492, 499 (1890) (finding that where a duty was owed to the public but not
private individuals, Michigan law applied in plaintiff's action for an injury caused by a defec-
tive sidewalk).
1989]
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general law on a particular subject.... ."15
In practice, Swift did not achieve its desired ends. 16 The grave discrimina-
tion caused by Swift led to its demise in Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins.17 Per-
haps the most blatantly discriminatory example occurred in Black & White
Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co. Is There, a plaintiff succeeded in
a suit to enjoin a competitor from interfering with an exclusive contract.
Since the common law of Kentucky voided such contracts, the plaintiff rein-
corporated in Tennessee which honored such agreements. This form of fo-
rum shopping caused widespread criticism of the Swift decision.' 9 The Erie
Court also cited the persistence of state courts in maintaining their common
law, and the impossibly vague distinctions between general and local law.
Justice Brandeis noted the "mischievous results" in diversity of citizenship
cases.2° Particularly odious was the twisted ability of a non-citizen to deter-
mine the outcome of a dispute simply by filing suit in the forum (state or
federal) whose applicable law was more favorable to his claim. Justice Bran-
deis perceived no basis in the Constitution for granting power to Congress or
the federal courts to fashion substantive rules of local or general common
law in a specific state.21 In sum, the Court held the circuit court's ruling
contrary to Pennsylvania law as an improper invasion of constitutional
principles.
15. Baugh, 149 U.S. at 401. (Field, J., dissenting) ("Supervision over either the legislative
or the judicial action of the States is in no case permissible except as to matters by the Consti-
tution specifically authorized or delegated to the United States.").
16. Swift, 41 U.S. at 18. Justice Story hoped that Swift would make uniform state and
federal law. His strong belief in such uniformity is evidenced by his quotation from Cicero
stating that the law among the Romans cannot differ from the law among the Athenians. Id at
19.
17. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
18. 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
19. See, e.g., Dobie, Seven Implications of Swift v. Tyson, 16 VA. L. REV. 225 (1930); Ball,
Revision of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 28 ILL. L. REV. 356, 362-64 (1933); Jacobson, Fed-
eral Interpretation of State Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 335 (1938).
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982). The statute in pertinent part states that "(a) The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy ex-
ceeds the sum or value of $10,000 ... between -
(1) citizens of different States
(2) citizens of a State or of a foreign state . The historical justification for diversity
jurisdiction is to protect the nonresident party from local state court bias. Id. See Friendly,
The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction,. 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 510 (1928) ("This had its
origins in fears of local hostilities, which had only a speculative existence in 1789, and are still
less real today."); See also 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E., COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3601 (1984) [hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE].
21. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
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B. Modifications of the Erie Doctrine
Ironically, on the same day that Justice Brandeis wrote in Erie that
"[t]here is no federal general common law,"22 he also declared that federal
common law applied to interstate streams in Hinderlider v. La Plata River &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co.23 In essence, Justice Brandeis carved the first excep-
tion to Erie by recognizing an overriding federal interest in interstate waters.
An important development in the Erie doctrine requires the application of
state law if "it significantly affect[s] the result of litigation for a federal court
to disregard a law of a state that would be controlling in an action upon the
same claim by the same parties in a state court." '24 This "outcome determi-
native" test works well in a simple product liability tort action. However,
difficulties with this approach arise in mass tort cases. These problems are
discussed infra.
This new Erie test spurred further exceptions to the doctrine. In Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperative, Inc.,25 the Court held that "counter-
vailing considerations" permit a balance between state and federal inter-
ests.26 While the Court generally hesitates to expand federal law, Byrd
shows the Court's willingness to defer to substantial federal interests.27
II. FEDERAL COMMON LAW DEFINED
Federal common law is created by a court to resolve a matter where no
reference to the Constitution, federal statutes, or state law directly settles the
issue. 21 Whereas pre-Erie general common law caused two regimes of rules
for similar situations, post-Erie federal common law binds the states by vir-
tue of the Supremacy Clause. As a result, federal courts are bound to follow
state decisions which involve state issues and state courts are therefore
bound to follow federal decisions which involve federal issues.29
22. Id. at 78.
23. 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
24. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
25. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
26. Id. at 537.
27. See also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
28. See Field, supra note 11, at 890 (defining federal common law as "any rule of federal
law created by a court ... when the substance of that rule is not clearly suggested by federal
enactments - constitutional or congressional.") (emphasis in original); Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases:
Cause for More Darkness on the Subject, or a New Role for Federal Common Law, 54 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 167, 189 (1986) ("Federal common law is simply a label pinned on a rule of law
created by a federal court when it finds that an issue cannot be resolved directly by reference to
the Constitution, a treaty, a federal statute, or state law.").
29. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 383, 407 (1964) ("[Sltate courts must conform to federal decisions in areas where Con-
1989]
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The courts recognize a presumption in favor of applying state laws to a
particular conroversy.3° Some areas, however, are viewed as the traditional
bailiwick of the federal courts. Professor Hill defines a four zone theory
which outlines these areas. The four zones include maritime cases, interna-
tional law cases, interstate cases, and those cases involving the proprietary
interests of the United States.31 Other commentators, however, see "no
bright lines delineating matters of which federal courts have the power to
9932develop and apply federal common law....
The Court's most common Erie exception stems from the rights and du-
ties of the United States in commercial paper transactions. In Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States,33 the Court held that federal common law gov-
erned the controversy because of specific federal competence in the area and
the need for national uniformity.34 Again, the Court stressed the impor-
tance of balancing federal and state interests in arriving at the decision.
Supreme Court decisions following Clearfield focus upon similar criteria.
These cases look to a unique federal interest and implicit or explicit congres-
sional permission to employ federal common law.35
Federal common law developed beyond Clearfield to include suits be-
tween private parties. In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,36 the Court held
that in a labor union's suit to compel arbitration under § 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act,37 federal common law applied to the contro-
versy. While the Act did not expressly call for the application of federal
common law, Justice Douglas saw implied federal rights in the "penumbra
of express statutory mandates.",38 Lincoln Mills holds a prominent place in
the development of federal common law. More importantly, it shows that a
federal court does not need reference to express congressional permission in
gress, acting within power granted to it, has manifested, be it ever so lightly, an intention to
that end.").
30. Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1517 (1969) ("One reason
for this general presumption is that the promulgation of federal decisional rules may negate
several inherent advantages of state-by-state solution of problems.").
31. Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1069
(1967).
32. 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4514, at 221.
33. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
34. Id. at 366-67.
35. See, e.g., Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1967) (federal common law
may be applied when federal rights stem from federal sources of law); Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (federal common law applied even though neither the United
States nor a federal officer was a party).
36. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)(1982).
38. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457.
Agent Orange and Asbestos
order to apply federal common law.39 In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee," the
Court unanimously found that federal common law applied where federal
environmental statutes involving interstate waters expressed federal con-
cerns.41 Once again, the Court provided a federal remedy where federal in-
terests were involved. Here, the combination of statutes and the interstate
nature of the dispute proved that "[i]t is not uncommon for federal courts to
fashion federal law where federal rights are involved." 42 Against this back-
ground, the case for application of federal common law in other areas is
made stronger.
III. AGENT ORANGE AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW
While Erie-based decisions stress the prominent role of state law, sufficient
leeway to permit the application of federal common law remains. As Part I
of this Comment indicates, the courts have refused to render the Erie princi-
ples absolute. Two mass product liability cases, involving Agent Orange and
asbestos, exemplify the type of Erie exception to which the courts refer. The
federal courts, however, are not uniform in their approval of applying fed-
eral common law in mass tort cases.
A. Agent Orange
In 1979, a complaint was filed in the Eastern District of New York on
behalf of Vietnam Veterans and their families alleging injuries caused by
exposure to Agent Orange.43 While seventeen defendant chemical compa-
nies were named, only seven remained when the dispute was finally settled in
1984." From 1979 to 1983, the parties wrangled with complex jurisdic-
tional issues until the plaintiffs attained class certification and reasserted di-
versity jurisdiction. A trial date was set for May 7, 1984. On that day, the
39. Id at 457. In reference to the Act's ambiguous areas regarding substantive law, Jus-
tice Douglas stated further that "[s]ome will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved
by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that
policy." Id. The mass tort context provides a similar situation whereby Congress has passed
considerable legislation concerning toxic chemicals.
40. 406 U.S. 91 (1971).
41. Id. at 99-101.
42. Id. at 103 (quoting Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457).
43. The name "Agent Orange" comes from the orange ring painted around the chemical
container distinguishing it from other herbicides. The chemical proved effective in defoliating
the lush Vietnam jungle which obstructed Viet Cong activity. Manufacturers have long main-
tained that no evidence exists to prove that soldiers were heavily exposed to Agent Orange.
But see Scientists Say Troops Heavily Exposed To Defoliant, Washington Post, Jan. 23, 1989, at
A2, col. 3.
44. Settlement Opinion, 597 F. Supp. at 753.
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plaintiffs accepted a settlement offer of 180 million dollars.4 5 Eventually, the
Second Circuit affirmed both the class certification and settlement,4 6 and
summary judgment was granted against class opt-outs.47 The court did not,
however, approve an attorney fee-sharing agreement. 48
The Agent Orange litigation involved a great number of plaintiffs and a
large sum of money.4 9 As a prominent landmark for future mass toxic tort
cases, Agent Orange forces our society to recognize the strong possibility of
recurring toxic incidents.5 ° In order to confront the litigation's numerous
problems, reviewing choice-of-law problems is necessary.
In their initial complaint, the plaintiffs' stated that their basis for federal
jurisdiction was 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).51 They contended that their
claims arose under United States statutes and common law. The plaintiffs
sought an implied private cause of action from various laws governing toxic
substances.52 The district court subsequently rejected this argument."
The court ruled favorably upon the complaint's call for federal common
law.54 Judge Pratt sustained this choice-of-law because there were "signifi-
cant federal interests in this litigation."55 The decision by Judge Pratt was
not a nonsensical rush to create an easy solution. Rather, he reasoned that
mass tort product liability litigation was not an area of expertise for state
courts.
5 6
To Judge Pratt's credit, he acknowledged the weight of authority against
federal common law. In citing Miree v. DeKalb,57 Judge Pratt raised the
Supreme Court's admonition that "the issue of whether to displace state law
45. Id. at 748. For a thorough review of the Agent Orange procedural history, see Note,
Procedural History of the Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV.
335 (1986).
46. 818 F.2d 145, 174 (2d Cir. 1987).
47. 818 F.2d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 1987).
48. 818 F.2d 216, 226 (2d Cir. 1987).
49. P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 4-5
(1986). (Six hundred actions were originally filed by over 15,000 plaintiffs in the United States.
Eventually the litigation involved over two million veterans and their families. Plaintiffs' costs
exceeded ten million dollars while the defendants grew to one hundred million dollars. The
docket sheet was 425 pages in length including 7,300 entries.).
50. Id. at 14. (The EPA currently has identified over 19,000 hazardous waste sites.
Cleanup costs could exceed 100 billion dollars.).
51. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 737, 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
52. Id. at 740-41; see also supra note 5.
53. Id. at 741-42.
54. Id. at 749.
55. Id.
56. Id. ("[S]tate law has not considered the complex question of a war contractor's liabil-
ity to soldiers injured by toxic chemicals subject to federal regulation while engaged in combat
and serving abroad."). Id.
57. 433 U.S. 25, 32 (1977).
Agent Orange and Asbestos
or an issue such as this is primarily a decision for Congress."58 The issue in
Miree, whether private parties may, as third party beneficiaries, sue a munic-
ipality for breach of FAA contracts, does not compare with the types of
issues in the Agent Orange case. The substantial federal interests implicated
in the Agent Orange dispute were not "far too speculative" to prevent an
application of federal common law.59 The district court then sought to es-
tablish the foundation for invoking common law. While the court disagreed
with the plaintiffs' choice of the Clearfield standard, Judge Pratt found his
justification in the rationale of United States v. Standard Oil."
The district court applied a three-factor test in combination with the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Standard Oil. There, the United States sought
recovery from the defendant for a soldier's hospitalization costs after the
defendant's truck injured him.6 The Court held that the relationship be-
tween the government and its soldiers is "fundamentally derived from fed-
eral sources and governed by federal authority."6 2 The test Judge Pratt used
to determine whether federal common law applied was based upon: (1) a
substantial federal interest in the outcome; (2) the effect of a state law appli-
cation upon this interest; and (3) the effect of a federal common law applica-
tion upon state interests.6" This test properly balances state and federal
interests mandated by the Supreme Court.
In dealing with the first factor Judge Pratt articulated the importance of
preventing interference with the relationship between government and sol-
dier."4 The court also held that the federal interest rose commensurate with
the increasing liability of the defendants and the large number of veterans
claiming injuries.65
The second and third standards applied by the court consider the balance
of federal and state law. Under the second factor, the court emphasized the
burdensome effect of varying state laws upon federal interests66 because of
the unfairness which would result from treating similarly situated plaintiffs
58. Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 748 (quoting Miree v. Dekalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 32
(1977)).
59. Miree, 433 U.S. at 32-33.
60. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
61. Id. at 302.
62. Id. at 305.
63. Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 746.
64. Id. The court dismissed the defendants' claim that the plaintiffs' injuries were ade-
quately covered by the Compensation for Service-Connected Disability or Death Act, 38
U.S.C. § 310et seq. (1976). "The limited nature of compensation provided by 38 U.S.C. § 310
et seq. makes it an insufficient guardian of the rights at stake in this litigation." Id. at 747.
65. Id. at 747.
66. Id. at 748.
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differently.67 Turning to the third standard, the court reasoned that tort
claims are traditionally state law matters. 68 However, the court distin-
guished traditional torts by asserting that "state law has not considered the
complex question of a war contractor's liability to soldiers injured by toxic
chemicals subject to federal regulation while engaged in combat and serving
abroad."'69 Therefore, Judge Pratt held that a displacement of state law
would not adversely affect state interests.7° For the above-cited reasons, the
district court assumed subject matter jurisdiction over the Agent Orange
dispute.
After distinguishing Clearfield and Standard Oil from Agent Orange, the
Second Circuit reversed the district court.7 Judge Kearse focused on Judge
Pratt's first factor to the exclusion of all others. The court's guiding princi-
ple for the application of federal common law was the determination of a
significant conflict between a federal policy and the use of state law.7 2
Thereafter, Judge Kearse saw no "identifiable federal policy at stake."73
Next, the court stated that the mere fact that state laws would render
different decisions, and, thus destroy uniformity, was an insufficient basis to
justify application of federal common law. Judge Kearse cited Auto Workers
v. Hoosier Corp. 74 to stress that even under a federal statute calling for fed-
eral common law, the Supreme Court has rejected the uniform application of
one statute of limitations.75 While the court concluded that the federal gov-
ernment has "interests in the welfare of the parties," Judge Kearse saw no
federal interest in the outcome of the dispute.76
In his strongly worded dissent, Chief Judge Feinberg perceived no basis
for Judge Kearse's majority view. Judge Feinberg, citing Owens v. Haas,
77
where the Second Circuit held that a federal prisoner, injured by county jail
officials working under a federal contract, could use federal common law,
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 749.
70. Id.
71. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987, 993 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
72. Id. (quoting Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
73. Id.
74. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
75. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d at 994. In Auto Workers, the Court
decided a suit governed by federal common law pursuant to § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). Based upon a determination of timeliness of § 301
suits, the Court refused to fill a gap left by Congress because "the teaching of our cases does
not require so bold a form of judicial innovation." 383 U.S. at 701.
76. Agent Orange, 635 F.2d at 995.
77. 601 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979).
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compared the factual circumstances there with the Agent Orange features.7 8
The dissent expressed disbelief that federal prisoners were afforded the bene-
fit of federal common law while soldiers were not.7 9
The dissent also emphasized the statutory scheme affecting veterans. Just
as the Owens Court noted the statutes regarding prisoners' rights as an indi-
cation of congressional intent to provide general protections, 80 Judge Fein-
berg listed numerous statutes providing for veterans' disabilities and welfare
to justify application of federal common law."1
Chief Judge Feinberg did not hold that the government's presence or the
soldiers' role in the suit are required. Instead, he mirrored Judge Pratt's
allusion to Miree's three prong test holding that the use of federal common
law depends upon the substantial federal interests, the effect on federal inter-
ests through a state law application, and the effect on state interests through
a federal law application.82 Agent Orange satisfies these standards.
It is important to note that the plaintiffs called for the use of federal com-
mon law based upon subject matter jurisdiction. The issue presented was
not the determination of substantive law. Rather, the main issue centered
around the plaintiffs' assertion that the case-arose under federal common
law. Therefore, one could find fault with the analysis of both the majority
and dissent. The majority, while properly respecting the limited jurisdiction
of Article III courts, failed to adequately consider the strong case the plain-
tiffs' made for the application of federal common law. The dissent, in its
focus upon federal common law, ignored the limited jurisdiction of Article
III courts.
B. Agent Orange and Conflict of Laws
Shortly after the Second Circuit's decision, the Agent Orange case was
certified as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).13 As a result,
78. 635 F.2d at 997.
79. Id. at 998. ("It is anomalous for this court to hold, on the one hand, that the federal
government has an interest in 'uniform treatment' of its prisoners sufficient to warrant the use
of a federal rule of recovery, and, on the other hand, that the federal government has no such
interest in uniform treatment of its soldiers."). Id. (emphasis in original.).
80. Owens, 601 F.2d at 1249.
81. Agent Orange, 635 F.2d at 997. See e.g., 38 U.S.C. at §§ 310-315 (compensation for
wartime disabilities), §§ 321-22 (wartime death compensation for survivors); see also 10 U.S.C.
§ 121 (1982) (President's regulatory power), § 3012(b)(1) (the Secretary's responsibilities for
the welfare of the Army).
82. Agent Orange, 635 F.2d at 996.
83. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), modified,
100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y.), cert. denied, 100 F.R.D. 735 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), mandamus denied
sub nom. In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1067 (1984).
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the parties attained complete diversity because only the named plaintiffs and
defendants to the suit were subject to the diversity requirements.84 In addi-
tion, the named plaintiffs' claims also exceeded the $10,000 monetary
limitation. 5
In 1983, an important event occurred which shaped the future course of
the case. Judge Pratt, the district court judge, was elevated to the Second
Circuit leaving the case in the hands of Judge Weinstein. The diversity juris-
diction action left two questions for Judge Weinstein to decide: (1) which
state's law would the forum state use, and (2) which particular choice-of-law
rules would that state's courts apply.8 6
Judge Weinstein resolved these issues by holding that the question of
which state's law applied was unimportant. 87 The essential point he main-
tained was that any state court "would look to a federal or a national con-
sensus law of manufacturer's liability, government contract defense, and
punitive damages' ' 8 to resolve the conflict.
Even though the Second Circuit had previously ruled that no substantial
federal interest was involved, Judge Weinstein distinguished his opinion on
two separate grounds. First, he argued that the Second Circuit decision was
based only upon jurisdiction and not choice-of-law considerations.89 Sec-
ondly, Judge Weinstein held that circumstances had changed since the Sec-
ond Circuit opinion which heightened the federal interest.9° Furthermore,
in addressing the Second Circuit's contention that the parties were purely
private, the court pointed out that the government was a third-party defend-
ant as to the claims of veterans' wives and children.
9 1
Judge Weinstein's role in fashioning national consensus law is soundly
criticized for its lack of a proper foundation. The term "national consensus
law" does not appear in any federal or state case preceding Agent Orange.
92
It could be argued that Judge Weinstein saw the ends and invented the
means. His application of national consensus law, the law that the collective
states would apply, avoided the complex choice-of-law mess, but amounted
84. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969), reh'g denied, 394 U.S. 1025.
85. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
86. SCHUCK, supra note 49, at 128.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 129 (quoting Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. at 697).
89. 580 F. Supp. at 697.
90. Id. at 698. Judge Weinstein cited Pub. L. No. 97-72, 95 Stat. 1047 (1981) which
amends the Veterans Health Care, Training and Small Business Loan Act of 1981 to authorize
the Veterans Administration to provide Agent Orange victims with medical services. Id.
91. 580 F. Supp. at 698 (citing In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242
(E.D.N.Y.), mandamus denied, 733 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1984).
92. A LEXIS search in the Genfed Library for all courts and a similar search in the States
Library reveals this fact.
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to "rank insubordination., 93 Conversely, Judge Weinstein is often praised
for the wisdom of his decision. In his thorough coverage of the Agent Or-
ange case, Professor Schuck finds that Weinstein's role, while testing the
bounds of judicial propriety, effectively and equitably balanced the interests
of plaintiffs and defendants.94
IV. ASBESTOS AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW
The widely disparate statistics concerning the number of asbestos claims is
understandable when the chemical's pervasive nature is reviewed. In the
1970's, the United States consumed over 800,000 short tons of asbestos per
year.95 Over three thousand household products contain asbestos including
floor tiles, plaster, and insulation. 96 Long-ranging latency periods explain
why shipyard workers, truck drivers and their families commonly file claims
today after years of exposure.97 This section focuses upon one asbestos case
and the need to uniformly adjudicate asbestos claims.
While asbestos-related claims followed a different legal trail than those
involved in Agent Orange, the number of plaintiffs and lawyers involved is
equally staggering.98 The most striking difference between the two mass tort
cases is the lack of consolidation in asbestos litigation. This situation did not
prevent the Fifth Circuit from waging an analytical war over the virtues and
vices of federal common law.
In Jackson v. Johns-Manville Corp.," the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc,
held in a 9-5 decision that federal common law could not displace a state
punitive damage law."° Jackson, the plaintiff, won a substantial punitive
damage award in the district court. ' On appeal, the defendants argued
that Mississippi's law governing damages did not apply and that federal
93. SCHUCK, supra note 49, at 130.
94. Id. at 159.
95. See Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and Political Issues Raised by the
Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND. L. REV. 573, 579 (1983).
96. Id. at 581.
97. Id.
98. See WILLGING, supra note 4, at 12. Recent estimates of the number of cases range
from 30,000 to 50,000. New cases continue to be filed, and Johns-Manville estimates that it
will have to pay between $83,000. and $100,000. for personal injury claims as a part of its
reorganization. Id. See also T. WILLGING, ASBESTOS CASE MANAGEMENT: PRETRIAL AND
TRIAL PROCEDURES 5-6 (Federal Judicial Center 1985) (despite the view that asbestos cases
have become routine products liability disputes, the lack of judicial resources and firm trial
dates continues to plague the disposition of claims).
99. 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
100. Id. at 1326.
101. Id. at 1317. The jury imposed punitive damages against Johns-Manville in the
amount of $500,000.
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common law sufficed. Ironically, in the Agent Orange dispute, the plaintiffs
argued for the application of federal common law. Faced with the punitive
damage law of many jurisdictions, defendant Johns-Manville argued for the
application of federal common law.
Just as the Second Circuit acknowledged the national scope of Agent Or-
ange, the Fifth Circuit did the same with this asbestos case. 12 The defend-
ants feared that the imposition of punitive damages would destroy their
ability to adequately compensate future victims.10 3 Such payments would
"require asbestos companies to expend their resources at a more accelerated
pace to the detriment of future plaintiffs.'
In response to the defendants' call for the application of federal common
law, the court refused their request on the grounds that a mere conflict over
a "common fund or scarce resources" did not create sufficient interstate con-
flicts. 105 Judge Randall, writing for the majority, pointed out that substantial
federal interests are not implicated in the absence of express congressional
policy or an effect upon the federal authority and duties of the United
States. 106
The court also refused to assert federal judicial power merely because jus-
tice impelled its application."17 Judge Randall feared such an action would
erode Erie's constitutional underpinnings. Also, the court viewed the appli-
cation of federal common law as opening the floodgates for its application to
other legal problems without principle. 10'
Chief Judge Clark's dissent unequivocally rejected the majority's view
that "justice is too abstract, too all-encompassing a concept to serve as a
basis for state substantive law in diversity cases."' 0 9 The dissent accused the
court of giving short shrift to the unprecedented volume of asbestos litiga-
tion in the federal courts. 0 Judge Clark also noted that three asbestos com-
panies entered Chapter 1 1 reorganization bankruptcy proceedings.','
Furthermore, the inconsistent implementation of state punitive damages law
would cause "disproportionate awards, consum[ing] the only assets available
102. Id. at 1326.
103. Id. at 1323.
104. Id. This "altruistic" motive of the defendants most likely did not sit well with the
court. The industry as a whole suppressed information about the hazardous and dangerous
qualities of asbestos. See WILLGING, supra note 4, at 7.
105. Id. at 1324.
106. Id. at 1325.
107. Id. at 1325-26.
108. Id. at 1326.
109. Id. at 1324.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1330 n.2. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr. 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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to compensate late-filing but equally deserving plaintiffs." ' 2 The dissent re-
minded the majority of Chief Justice Burger's holding in Miree which stated
that federal common law is not precluded in all matters involving private
litigants." 3 Judge Clark also called for judicial action which would draw
congressional attention to the problem." 4 Lastly, the dissent reiterated the
need to submit certified questions to the Supreme Court to address these
complex issues. 5
V. FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND THE MASS TORT
Erie's failure is the doctrine's strict application to the complex area of
mass tort law. The fathers of that doctrine could not have foreseen the uni-
queness and complexity of the mass tort case. Erie involved a single plaintiff
against a lone defendant. Mass tort cases are not as simple. The historical
basis of Erie, the Court's distaste for federal common law preemption of
state law, are not germane to the mass tort case. State law lacks the sophisti-
cation needed to address the complexities of mass tort litigation and to this
date has not done so.
This author acknowledges that while it is convenient to simply throw fed-
eral common law into the morass, it is more important to establish the nexus
between well-settled criteria for applying federal common law to the unique
characteristics of the mass toxic tort." 6 It is thus essential to this proposal
to draw from the definition of federal common law in Part II of this Com-
ment and from the cases cited in Parts III and IV of this Comment to estab-
lish a sound constitutional and statutory basis for the application of federal
common law.
The Supreme Court has held that federal common law essentially falls
within two areas. First, the Court acknowledges the importance of protect-
ing "uniquely federal interests. ' "17 Secondly, the Court looks for an implicit
or explicit congressional permit to the federal courts to make substantive
112. Id. at 1330.
113. Id. at 1331.
114. Id. at 1333.
115. Id. at 1335. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3)(1982).
116. See supra note 1. It is essential to stress again the distinction this Comment makes
between the mass tort accident and the mass tort product liability case. The mass tort accident
is less complex and does not involve the difficulties of mass tort product litigation. See Mul-
lenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal Procedure Act, 64 TEX. L.
REV. 1039, 1046 (1986). Professor Mullenix contrasts a nationwide mass-injury case with a
single incident involving far fewer plaintiffs. See also Note, Federal Mass Tort Class Actions: A
Step Toward Equity and Efficiency, 47 ALB. L. REV. 1180, 1183 (1983) (distinguishing an
accident as a sudden disaster from a product defect causing widespread injury).
117. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
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law."' 8 Both criteria provide strong bases to support the application of fed-
eral common law.
A. Punitive Damages and Federal Common Law
Punitive damages are awarded to punish a defendant for his actions and to
set an example for potential wrongdoers11 9 In the mass toxic tort context,
punitive damages are especially necessary because of extreme toxic chemical
exposure presents danger to the public welfare. Conversely, a single plaintiff
should not receive punitive damages to the detriment of other similarly situ-
ated plaintiffs' needs for compensatory damages. Rather, all similarly situ-
ated plaintiffs should receive a market share from a lump-sum award.
Punitive damages do not deter or punish if the defendant becomes insolvent
and subsequently cannot cover its compensatory obligations to injured plain-
tiffs. Therefore, mass toxic tort cases require a mandatory class action on
the issue of punitive damages pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B)."2°
While, the class action device is not the best method to apply, it is, however,
the only available tool which the courts may presently employ. Further-
more, class certification with an opt-out clause is appropriate for other issues
such as compensatory damages and causation. 121
In Agent Orange, Judge Weinstein applied the limited fund theory in certi-
fying the class for punitive damages.1 22 That litmus test evaluates the sub-
stantial probability that the combination of punitive and compensatory
damages will exceed the defendant's assets.1 23 On the surface, the test gives
118. Id.
119. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 352 (5th Ed. 1979) (Punitive damages are "awarded to
the plaintiff over and above what will barely compensate him for his property loss . . . to
punish the defendant for his evil behavior or to make an example of him.") Id. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(l)(1979).
120. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 725 (1983)("The Para-
digm Rule 23(b)(l)(B) case is one in which there are multiple claimants to a limited fund...
and there is a risk that if litigants are allowed to proceed on an individual basis those who sue
first will deplete the fund and leave nothing for latecomers.") (quoting A. MILLER, AN OVER-
VIEW OF FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 45 (1977)).
121. The Advisory Committee's notes state:
A mass accident resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropri-
ate for a class action certification because of the likelihood that significant questions,
not only of damages but of liability and defenses to liability would be present, affect-
ing the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances an action conducted
nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits sepa-
rately tried.
Advisory Committee Notes to Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966),
quoted in Panzer & Patton, Utilizing the Class Action Device in Mass Tort Litigation, 21 TORT
& INS. L.J. 560, 562 n.4 (1986).
122. 100 F.R.D. at 725.
123. Id. A more contemporary opinion today is that of Judge Friendly in Roginsky v.
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the appearance of an easy escape for defendants. In practice, however, the
application of the theory involves a detailed review of the defendant's bal-
ance sheets, and a calculation of potential claims. The courts should apply
the limited fund theory test in the interest of similarly situated plaintiffs and
latent claims.
The mere certification of a mandatory class of those seeking punitive dam-
ages does not hurdle the choice-of-law problems. Choice-of-law rules pro-
vide various standards for punitive damages. Judge Clark points out that
"[a]side from the inequity resulting from the fact that some states do not
permit such awards, they carry the seeds to ultimately defeat the basic pur-
pose of product liability law."' 24 A federal common law proclaiming one
uniform rule for the amount of punitive damages, as well as an equal distri-
bution among plaintiffs similarly affected by the same chemical, is funda-
mentally fair.
An argument may be raised that the mass toxic tort case poses problems
no different from other tort cases involving punitive damages. That is un-
true. If only a few plaintiffs suffered the affects of toxic chemicals, the solu-
tions raised here would be baseless and unnecessary. Mass toxic torts,
however, involve thousands of potential claimants. The numbers alone are
cause to offer other remedies.
B. Choice-of-Law and Federal Common Law
Choice-of-law rules impede the fair adjudication of claims. In Agent Or-
ange, the parties spent millions of dollars and wasted much time determining
the applicable law. 25 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. 126 held that a
federal court sitting in diversity must apply the choice-of-law rules of that
state. Most choice-of-law rules mandate the application of the law of each
plaintiff's jurisdiction. In the mass tort context, some commentators liken
this to requiring a trial judge to enroll in fifty different courses, studying each
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967): "The legal difficulties engendered
by claims for punitive damages on the part of hundreds of plaintiffs are staggering .... We
have the gravest difficulty in perceiving how claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity
of actions throughout the nation can be so administered as to avoid overkill." Quoted in Selt-
zer, Punitive Damages In Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency
and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37; 53 (1983). Professor Seltzer's article offers other solu-
tions to the punitive damages problem.
124. Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1332 (5th Cir. 1985).
125. See Mullenix, supra note 116, at 1076 ("Choice-of-law problems significantly increase
the complexity, expense and duration of mass-tort-litigation .... After the applicable law is
determined the lawsuit can grind to a halt while the court determines whether to apply state or
federal rules to a particular legal question."). Id.
126. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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state's tort law, and requiring correct application of each state's law on the
final exam. 127 Situations such as these dictate the need for one uniform fed-
eral common law.
In Agent Orange, after the Second Circuit refused subject matter jurisdic-
tion based upon federal common law, the plaintiffs' amended complaint as-
serted diversity jurisdiction. Faced with complex choice-of-law problems,
Judge Weinstein declared a "national consensus law" because "each state
would probably apply the same law, that is to say either federal or national
common law."' 128 Judge Weinstein's logic has been soundly criticized.' 29 In
truth, no national consensus existed among the various state laws governing
product liability and punitive damages.
There are four common choice-of-law rules: governmental interest, Le-
flar, lex loci delicti, and comparative impairment. 130 The governmental in-
terest rule involves the forum state's choice of other state law where
sufficient contact between the plaintiff and another state is established.'
Since the contact amounts to a mere residency requirement, the rule cannot
be used to address the mass tort problem. The Leflar approach chooses the
"better law."' 13 2 This rule fails in light of the Supreme Court's recent hold-
ing in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts. 13 3 There, the Court held that a Kan-
sas state court lacked sufficient interest to adjudicate the claims of
nonresident plaintiffs under Kansas law.' The traditional lex loci delicti
rule follows the law of the state in which the court establishes "the last event
necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort."' 13" For obvious rea-
sons, this rule is impossible to apply in the mass toxic tort case. Finally, the
127. Miller & Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 64 (1986). See also Agent Orange, 580 F.
Supp. at 695 (Weinstein, J.) ("Since this is a diversity jurisdiction case ... this court ... sits
much as a state trial court would in New York, applying New York substantive law except
when.., a New York court would look to substantive law other than New York's in deciding
what substantive law would apply.").
128. Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. at 693.
129. See Miller & Crump, supra note 127, at 65-66 ("[T]he application of uniform law is a
legitimate policy choice that is better approached in a direct and honest way than through the
subterfuge of simply fudging differences among state laws to reach a disingenuous conclusion
that they are 'all the same.' "); see also SCHUCK, supra note 49, at 128-30 ("Weinstein's imagi-
native effort to neutralize the Second Circuit's decision and thus gain freedom to fashion a
better rule, then, was ultimately unpersuasive.").
130. See Note, Mass Tort Litigation: A Statutory Solution to the Choice of Law Impasse, 96
YALE L.J. 1077, 1081 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Mass Tort Litigation].
131. Id. at 1082.
132. Id. at 1083.
133. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
134. Id.
135. See RESTATEMENT OF LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-379 (1934).
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comparative impairment rule attempts to balance each state's interests136
Again, in the interest of time, equity, efficiency and conservation of judicial
resources, federal common law would apply one standard for plaintiffs and
defendants.
Choice-of-law problems also highlight the pre-existing interstate nature of
mass tort cases. The Court's decision in Hinderlider approves the applica-
tion of federal common law. Hinderlider involved an interstate dispute over
the apportionment of water. The case represents the problems which exist
when "conflicting state interests make the use of either state's law inappro-
priate." 137 Mass tort cases present the same conflict. The lack of federal
common law causes a "nationwide competition for scarce assets."
' 38
It is contended, in this Comment, that in Agent Orange and in similar
mass tort cases, federal common law should apply. The problems are suffi-
ciently national in scope and exhibit a significant conflict between a federal
policy and state law. Federal policy in the area of toxic products is subject
to extensive congressional regulation and policy. 139 The large body of envi-
ronmental and toxic products law evidences a substantial federal interest.
Further, it would seem that the thousands afflicted by asbestos are viewed as
a national concern.
One of the stronger proposals for the implementation of federal common
law calls for development of a federal mass-tort procedure act." By isolat-
ing those problems unique to mass tort cases, such an act would recognize
that "[t]he time is propitious for a mass-tort procedure act tailored to the
needs of victims, defendants and society."
' 141
In the absence of such a statute, the courts should not wait for the existing
congressional impasse to be broken.1 42 Many commentators foresee the
dangers and inequities which will flow from disproportionate and conflicting
state laws. The application of federal common law would allow the courts to
quickly bypass the lengthy and expensive process of determining the appli-
136. See Note, Mass Tort Litigation, supra note 130, at 1084.
137. Johns-Manville, 750 F.2d at 1331.
138. Id. at 1332.
139. See, e.g., supra note 5.
140. See Mullenix, supra note 116, at 1077. Section 9 of Professor Mullenix's proposed Act
states that:
[e]xcept as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statu-
tory authority, the rights and duties of parties to mass tort class action litigation,
pursuant to this Act, shall be governed by principles of common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of reason and experience.
Id. at 1095.
141. Id. at 1089.
142. Johns-Manville, 750 F.2d at 1333.
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This Comment proposes the application of federal common law for mass
toxic tort product liability cases. Respect for the Erie principles is shown by
a thorough examination of its history and development. While federal com-
mon law should be used sparingly, mass toxic tort litigation provides a set-
ting unique to Erie's factual basis. While it is important to defer to state
interests, federal common law acts interstitially to fill gaps and provides fair
adjudication in the absence of a well-developed body of state law geared
toward answering the needs of plaintiffs, defendants and the courts.
Francis V Kenneally
143. See Weinstein, The Role of the Court in Toxic Tort Litigation, 73 GEO. L.J. 1389, 1391
(1985) (stating "[w]e do not now have a method of determining the controlling law.").
